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Abstract Statistical modeling is generally meant to describe patterns in data in service of the broader scientific goal of developing theories to explain those patterns. Statistical models support meaningful inferences when models are built so as to align parameters of the model with potential causal mechanisms and how they manifest in data. When statistical models are instead based on assumptions chosen by default, attempts to draw inferences can be uninformative or even paradoxical—in essence, the tail is trying to wag the dog. These issues are illustrated by van Doorn et al. (this issue) in the context of using Bayes Factors to identify effects and interactions in linear mixed models. We show that the problems identified in their applications (along with other problems identified here) can be circumvented by using priors over inherently meaningful units instead of default priors on standardized scales. This case study illustrates how researchers must directly engage with a number of substantive issues in order to support meaningful inferences, of which we highlight two: The first is the problem of coordination , which requires a researcher to specify how the theoretical constructs postulated by a model are functionally related to observable variables. The second is the problem of generalization , which requires a researcher to consider how a model may represent theoretical constructs shared across similar but non-identical situations, along with the fact that model comparison metrics like Bayes Factors do not directly address this form of generalization. For statistical modeling to serve the goals of science, models cannot be based on default assumptions, but should instead be based on an understanding of their coordination function and on how they represent causal mechanisms that may be expected to generalize to other related scenarios. 

Current attempts at methodological reform in sciences come in response to an overall lack of rigor in methodological and scientific practices in experimental sciences. However, most methodological reform attempts suffer from similar mistakes and over-generalizations to the ones they aim to address. We argue that this can be attributed in part to lack of formalism and first principles. Considering the costs of allowing false claims to become canonized, we argue for formal statistical rigor and scientific nuance in methodological reform. To attain this rigor and nuance, we propose a five-step formal approach for solving methodological problems. To illustrate the use and benefits of such formalism, we present a formal statistical analysis of three popular claims in the metascientific literature: (i) that reproducibility is the cornerstone of science; (ii) that data must not be used twice in any analysis; and (iii) that exploratory projects imply poor statistical practice. We show how our formal approach can inform and shape debates about such methodological claims. 

Psychological science is at an inflection point: The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated inequalities that stem from our historically closed and exclusive culture. Meanwhile, reform efforts to change the future of our science are too narrow in focus to fully succeed. In this article, we call on psychological scientists—focusing specifically on those who use quantitative methods in the United States as one context for such conversations—to begin reimagining our discipline as fundamentally open and inclusive. First, we discuss whom our discipline was designed to serve and how this history produced the inequitable reward and support systems we see today. Second, we highlight how current institutional responses to address worsening inequalities are inadequate, as well as how our disciplinary perspective may both help and hinder our ability to craft effective solutions. Third, we take a hard look in the mirror at the disconnect between what we ostensibly value as a field and what we actually practice. Fourth and finally, we lead readers through a roadmap for reimagining psychological science in whatever roles and spaces they occupy, from an informal discussion group in a department to a formal strategic planning retreat at a scientific society. 

Abstract van Doorn et al. (2021) outlined various questions that arise when conducting Bayesian model comparison for mixed effects models. Seven response articles offered their own perspective on the preferred setup for mixed model comparison, on the most appropriate specification of prior distributions, and on the desirability of default recommendations. This article presents a round-table discussion that aims to clarify outstanding issues, explore common ground, and outline practical considerations for any researcher wishing to conduct a Bayesian mixed effects model comparison.